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6. On another occasion Max Millikan indicated that he was somewhat disappointed with the report as it finally went to press but the time precluded his doing anything about it. He seemed to feel that the scope of the report was unduly limited, and that it should have included coordination on a much broader scale of psychological and unconventional warfare activities.

7. For example, the report recommends [redacted]

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[redacted] But HRAF cannot properly be considered alone in view of the fact that NIS is so closely related to it, as are the Army-proposed Area Handbooks.

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8. Millikan further believes that our whole military posture is a subject that must be considered as part of the psychological and unconventional warfare. Troop morale, potential targets, methods of inducing surrender, decisions to establish new military bases, the effects of maneuvers and of the announcement of new types of weapons have far-reaching implications beyond the military. These matters might well be considered not only by the military service in question but more particularly by whatever national planning agency exists to consider psychological warfare techniques, if not by the National Security Council itself.

CLAUDE E. HAWLEY  
Coordinator  
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OIC/CEH:br (17 June 1953)

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